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Public-Private Partnerships

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The logo of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), consisting of the letters 'ADB' in a white serif font on a dark blue square background.

Outline

- ❑ What is a PPP?
- ❑ Why think PPP?
- ❑ PPP Options
 - Service Contracts
 - Management Contracts
 - Leases
 - Concessions and BOTs
 - Divestiture and BOOs
- ❑ Preconditions / Preparation
- ❑ PPP Procurement
- ❑ Challenges
- ❑ Experience in Asia

What is PPP?

- ❑ Collaboration between the public & private
 - Not the same as privatization!

- ❑ Relationship defined by a contract

- ❑ Structured to best assign roles
 - Responsibilities (service delivery, regulation, etc.)
 - Risks (tariffs, costs, technical, etc.)
 - Investment /ownership of asset

Why PPP?

- ❑ Reduction of outlays for Government
- ❑ Access to expertise and technology
- ❑ Efficiency under profit goal
- ❑ Catalyst for broader sector reform
- ❑ Access to more profitable markets

PPP Options

A broad range of options with increasing private sector content



Increasing private sector risk, responsibility, and financing

Service Contracts


- ❑ Goal = reduce cost through competition
 - Services / activities bid out to contractors
- ❑ Short in duration (typically < 3 yrs)
- ❑ For specific tasks – often non-core activities
 - Installing or reading meters
 - Security
 - Janitorial services
 - Collecting accounts
- ❑ Require careful monitoring and management

Management Contracts

- ❑ Goal = Improve overall management
- ❑ Responsibilities:
 - Government: asset ownership and all capital investment
 - Private Operator: day-to-day management, preventive maintenance , assistance with long range planning
- ❑ Institutional change:
 - Does not require change to overall institutional structure
 - PO staff are typically given line management responsibilities
- ❑ Typically three to five years in duration
- ❑ Compensation:
 - Fixed fee, and/or
 - Performance-based

Tariffs and Remuneration: Management Contract

- Management contract:
 - Some combination of:
 - Fixed fee
 - Incentive compensation
 - Profit sharing
 - Private partner's remuneration not directly linked with the level of tariff



Leases

- ❑ Goal = Improve performance and supplement government funds with limited private investment
- ❑ Responsibilities:
 - Private operator ("lessee"): Operation and maintenance, including collection of tariffs
 - Government ("lessor"): Capital investment
- ❑ Institutional change:
 - Government transforms state-owned enterprise into asset holding company ("AHC")
 - Private operator creates new special purpose company ("SPC")
- ❑ Typically 8 to 15 years long
- ❑ Compensation: Tariff revenues split between lessee (the "lessee fee" or "operator's tariff") and Government ("lease fee")




Organizational Structure: Lease



Tariffs and Remuneration: Lease

- ❑ Lessee (private):
 - Lessee fee (also called "operator's tariff"): A pre-defined (volumetric) fee collected via the tariff
- ❑ Lessor (public):
 - Lease fee: Tariff minus lessee fee
- ❑ Key question is how the commercial risk will be allocated




Concessions and BOTs

- ❑ Goal = Improve performance and attract private finance
- ❑ Responsibilities:
 - Private operator assumes all responsibility for operation, maintenance, and capital investment
 - Government retains asset ownership and is regulator
- ❑ Institutional change:
 - Concession (complex license contract) transfers rights and responsibilities to private operator's SPC
 - Under BOT – investment is green-field and asset ownership is with private operator until end of concession (when it shifts to government)
- ❑ Typically 20 to 30 years in duration
- ❑ Compensation: Tariff is collected and kept by private operator



Organizational Structure: Concessions and BOTs




Divestiture and BOOs

- ❑ Goal = Transfer Government responsibility for service provision and investment to private sector through sale of assets/shares to private owners or granting of development rights and license to private operator
- ❑ Government's role is as regulator – rather than a “partner” in the business
- ❑ BOO = greenfield, divestiture = sale of existing asset
- ❑ Duration: Permanent
- ❑ Compensation: New private owners remunerated entirely through tariff revenues



Comparison – Duration and Complexity



Preconditions / Preparation

- ❑ Regulatory regime
 - Sector regulation in place – or regulation by contract
- ❑ Enabling laws etc.
- ❑ Tariff and off-take agreements
- ❑ Institutional capacity at government
 - Design
 - Procurement
 - Monitoring
 - Enforcement
- ❑ Economically viable PPP proposals
 - Financial terms
 - Risk mitigation
- ❑ Interest from qualified private sector operators
- ❑ Political will – designated powerful “champion”

Subsidies/Viability-Gap Financing

- ❑ To make PPP viable government may have to make financial contribution
 - Investment subsidy – part of initial capital outlay in cash or in-kind (assets)
 - Operating subsidy – ongoing payments (fixed or linked to output)
 - Can be tied to pro-poor service delivery (output based aid – OBA)
- ❑ Justified as long as total cost to government is lower than public sector option (without PPP)
 - Subsidy to attract bidders
 - Competitive bidding to minimize subsidy

PPP Procurement Process

- ❑ Competitive bidding is standard
 - Get lowest cost / best package
 - Achieve transparency and accountability
- ❑ Direct negotiations / competitive negotiations only under special circumstances acceptable
- ❑ Auction process / rules can be tailored
 - Use professional advisors
 - Need in-depth professional preparation to avoid embarrassment from failed auction

Challenges / Concerns

- ❑ Public / consumers (voters...)
 - Increased tariffs – reduced affordability
 - Loss of “national assets”
- ❑ Public sector (operating entities, administration)
 - Job security
 - Loss of power / fiefdoms
 - Work involved in PPP preparation and procurement
- ❑ Private operators (various risks to viability)
 - Tariffs / regulatory regime and off-take agreements
 - Large investments and long payback periods
 - Access to long-term debt funding (incl. FX risks)
 - Labor issues
 - General political / legal enforcement risk
- ❑ SOLUTIONS EXIST – but concerns need to be taken seriously and addressed upfront in a transparent manner!

Experience in Asia

- ❑ Mostly BOTs:
 - Cheng Du (China), Nam Theun (Laos), Batangas and Quezon Power (Philippines), etc.
 - Often with take or pay arrangements
 - Regulation by contract did not necessitate regulatory framework reform
- Some concessions:
 - Jakarta, Manila, North Luzon
 - But several high profile failures
 - Requires more sophisticated regulatory framework
- ❑ Very few leases and management contracts

Thank you

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