
ADB Support to its Developing Member Countries During External Shocks

Instruments, Past Experience and Some Examples

2008-2018: Decade of External Shocks in Central West




ADB Support is Responsive to Two Key Realities:

- 1. Crises and Recessions leave long-term scars: "all types of recessions—including those arising from external shocks and small domestic macroeconomic policy mistakes—lead to permanent losses in output and welfare." (Cerra & Saxena, 2018)
 - Thus, supporting DMCs in fighting or countering recessionary swings in their economies is PRO DEVELOPMENT
- **2. Fiscal Support.** It is often crucial to insulate medium-term reform processes from fiscal shocks and difficulties in keeping fiscal stability.

Cerra & Saxena, 2018: "Economic policies should be geared toward avoiding crises and severe recessions, and responding with appropriate stimulus and safety nets."

New model of economic development Crises and recessions prevent poor countries from catching up to rich countries.



Options for ADB support (1/2)


- **OPTION 1**: Policy-Based-Lending (PBL), with two versions:
- **Stand-alone policy-based lending.** Budget support that is typically packaged as a multi-tranche loan to support structural reforms in a particular sector.
- **Programmatic Approach.** Provided in conjunction with structural reforms over a medium-term time frame. Programmatic budget support finances a series of subprograms, each as a fully front-loaded single-tranche intervention.
- Proceeds of the Policy-Based Loan are (i) disbursed in a minimum number of installments (e.g. 2 or 3), as either tranches or subprograms, upon Govt achievement of reform objectives and ADB internal review and processing; (ii) generally non-earmarked (earmarking solutions can also be devised to represent financing flows to a particular reform-related use).

Options for ADB support (2/2)

- **OPTION 2**: Countercyclical Support Facility (CSF) on fulfilling the following Access Criteria.
 - 1. Adverse impact of Exogenous Shock
 - 2. Countercyclical Development Expenditures/Policy for Poverty Reduction
 - 3. Sound Pre shock Macroeconomic Management
 - 4. Structural Reforms
 - 5. Debt Sustainability
 - 6. Coordination with IMF

GEO: Growth Recovery Support Program (2009)

- The loss of investor confidence, caused initially by the August 2008 conflict and then by the international financial crisis => sharp slowdown in capital inflows (both foreign direct investment and debt inflows) to Georgia => recessionary conditions in the largely dominating non-tradables sector.
- Stand-Alone Policy Loan (single tranche), approved in Q2-2009 for \$80 million-equivalent (fast-tracked processing):
 - Joint-Needs Assessment (with IFIs) and IMF Stand-By Arrangement as anchors.
 - Immediate Objectives:
 - 1. Meet incremental expenditure needs arising from the worse than-expected economic conditions in 2009 without complete drawn down of cash balances at NBG.
 - 2. Core Government expenditure program for 2009 delivered in accordance with approved budget, irrespective of subsequent shortfalls in revenue.
- Focus on key Financial Reforms as conditionalities, to establish banking sector stability tools and strengthen monetary management




ARM: Crisis Recovery Support Program (2009)

Sharp Negative Shock in FDI and Remittance Flows => Sharp Contraction in Household Investments in Construction and Construction Output => Collapse in Credit Quality and Real Estate Prices => Banking Instability

- Stand-Alone Policy Loan (single tranche), approved in Q2-2009 for \$80 millionequivalent (fast-tracked processing):
 - Anti-Crisis Action Plan and IMF Stand-By Arrangement as anchors.
 - Immediate Objectives:
 - Increase in social protection expenditures
 - Job creation through public investment implementation
 - 3. Eliminate salary and pension arrears

Conditionalities linked to:

- (1) IMF SBA (exchange-rate flexibility an the strengthening of deposit guarantee fund),
- (2) Countercyclical Fiscal Stimulus measures (e.g. acceleration of existin and planned new investments, direct support to SME)
- (3) Maintenance of Social Safety nets




KAZ: Countercyclical Support Loan (2009)

- Collapse in Oil Prices and other commodities => Sharp Contraction in Export Revenue, Stopping Capital Expenditures in the economy => Collapse in Credit Quality and Real Estate Prices => Banking Instability
- ADB's 2nd CSF Loan: September 2009 (fast-tracked processing). \$0.5billion, anchored in:
 - Anti-Crisis Plan (e.g. countercyclical expenditures)
 - Banking Sector Stability Plan



KAZAKHSTAN GDP ANNUAL GROWTH RATE



AZE: Countercyclical Support Loan (2016)

Collapse in Oil and Gas Prices => Sharp Contraction in Export Revenue, Stopping Capital Expenditures in the economy (private and public) => Collapse in Credit Quality and Real Estate Prices => Banking Instability and Sharp Contraction of Construction Activity

- CSF Loan, approved in 2016 (fasttracked processing), for \$0.5billion
 - Countercyclical expenditures: Social Assistance Programs, Economic Diversification Investments, Employment Generation.
 - TA project approved for preparation of structural reforms for 2017-2019: PFM, Medium-Term Fiscal and Budget Management, SOE Management, Financial Sector Development.

FOLLOW-UP ASSISTANCE ON STRUCTURAL REFORMS (Programmatic Approach: 2 subprograms):

- AZE: Improving Governance and Public Sector Efficiency Program (\$250m + \$250m)



AZERBAIJAN GDP ANNUAL GROWTH RATE



We believe ADB assistance helped CWRD countries mitigate and manage the impacts the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the oil price shocks of 2014-2015...

... BUT WHAT ARE THE LESSONS?

- ADB assistance was generally swift in providing one-time (single tranche) financial support and technical advice on crisis mitigation measures:
 - The effectiveness of crisis mitigation efforts was crucially contingent on (i) effective macro-economic management and (ii) Govts' ability to quickly design and implement its own anti-crisis plans;
 - In some instances, follow-up dialog towards programmatic assistance to design and help implement structural reforms was successful in establishing a medium-term, structural reform engagement
- 2. LESSONS ABOUT THE TYPE OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS THAT MAY BE A PRIORITY AFTER THE CRISES: Crisis moments are no time for effective medium-term reform decisions. But it is crucial to initiate plans for structural reforms and long term engagement *geared towards* avoiding future crises and severe recessions (by reducing macroeconomic vulnerability and establishing appropriate and credible fiscal rules and safety nets).

Important to note that recent CW DMC episodes are stories of...

- "bonanzas" gone wrong: Macro imbalances and lack of export diversification were at the root of precrises macroeconomic vulnerability: a competitive REER must remain a key target for monetary management in good times.
- Pre-crisis failure to establish institutional underpinnings of fiscal and crisis management: e.g. local currency debt markets development, and financial de-dollarization strategies are crucial.