Impact Evaluation of Infrastructure and Its Financing

Naoyuki Yoshino and Victor PontinesDeanResearch FellowAsian Development Bank Institute

Asia Regional Workshop on Public-Private partnership

ADBInstitute

Tokyo, Japan, 2 June 2015


The views expressed in this presentation are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.

Economic Effect of Infrastructure Investment (1) Macroeconomics analysis

- (1) Macroeconomics analysis(2) Micro-data approach
- **Sources of Finance for Infrastructure Investment** (1) by tax payers' money;
- (2) use of national savings (or postal savings);
 → Financial Inclusion
- (3) issue bond to construct infrastructures; → general obligation bond, project bond
- (4) Public-Private-Partnership
 - Too much borrowing from overseas might become the burden for the future.


Which Method will induce better performance of infrastructure ?

Marginal Productivity of Public Capital (Regional Disparity in Japan)



(C) 2014 Yoshino & Nakahigashi

Map of Japan from the North to the South



Economic Effect of Public Capital


 $Y_t = f(Kp_t, L_t, Kg_t)$ Simultaneous regression of **Translog Production Function** and Labor Share Function $\ln Y = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \ln Kp + (1 - \alpha_1) \ln E + \alpha_3 \ln Kg$ + ln Kp (- $\frac{1}{2}\beta_2 \ln Kp + \beta_2 \ln E + \beta_3 \ln Kg$) + ln E (- $\frac{1}{2}\beta_2 \ln E - \beta_3 \ln Kg$) + $\frac{1}{2}\beta_6 - (\ln Kg)^2$ $S_E = \frac{wE}{nY} = \frac{\partial \ln Y}{\partial \ln E} = (1 - \alpha_1) + \beta_2 \ln Kp - \beta_2 \ln E - \beta_3 \ln Kg$

Marginal Productivity of Public Capital (in Japan)

$\mathbf{Period}(\mathbf{FY})$	1956 - 60	1961 - 65	1966 - 70	1971 - 75	1976 - 80	1981 - 85
Direct Effect	0.696	0.737	0.638	0.508	0.359	0.275
Indirect Effect(Private Capital)	0.453	0.553	0.488	0.418	0.304	0.226
Indirect Effect(Labor Input)	1.071	0.907	0.740	0.580	0.407	0.317
Private Capital	0.444	0.485	0.452	0.363	0.294	0.262


Period(FY)	1986 - 90	1991 - 95	1996 - 00	2001 - 05	2006 - 10
Direct Effect	0.215	0.181	0.135	0.114	0.108
Indirect Effect(Private Capital)	0.195	0.162	0.122	0.100	0.100
Indirect Effect(Labor Input)	0.192	0.155	0.105	0.090	0.085
Private Capital	0.272	0.242	0.219	0.202	0.194

Changes in Productivity of Capital (in Japan)




Effectiveness of Public Capital Stock

- "Private capital/Public capital ratio" to "Marginal productivity of Public capital" -



Explanation of Direct and Indirect Effects




Micro Case Study - Philippine micro data Objectives:

1, Evaluation of the 'highway effect' on tax and non-tax revenues using as case study the Southern Tagalog Arterial Road (STAR) in Batangas Province, Philippines

2, Evaluation is carried out using a quasiexperimental approach via a difference-indifference (DiD) analysis


Case Study: Southern Tagalog Arterial Road (STAR)

- The Southern Tagalog Arterial Road (STAR) project in Batangas province, Philippines (south of Metro Manila) is a modified Built-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project.
- The 41.9 km STAR tollway was built to improve road linkage between Metro Manila and Batangas City, provide easy access to the Batangas International Port, and thereby accelerate industrial development in Batangas and nearby provinces.




Case Study: Southern Tagalog Arterial Road (STAR)

- There are two stages in this project: STAR Tollway I is a 22.16 kilometer four-lane highway stretching from Santo Tomas, Batangas to Lipa City (Batangas province) and opened to traffic in 2001
- STAR Tollway 2 is a 19.74 kilometer two-lane highway stretching from Lipa City to Batangas City and opened in 2008



Method: Difference-in-Difference (DiD) Analysis



Method: Difference-in-Difference (DiD) Analysis


Outcome variable

- We employ data on property tax revenues, business tax revenues, regulatory fees and user charges of the cities and municipalities comprising Batangas Province, Philippines.
- The tax and non-tax revenues data were obtained from the Philippine Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF)

Treatment group (D = 1)

Treatment group:

Lipa City, Ibaan and Batangas City



	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Property	Property	Business	Business	Regulatory	Regulatory	User	User
	tax	tax	tax	tax	fees	fees	charge	charge
Treatment D	1.370	1.466	0.819	0.776	0.932	0.929	0.513	0.612
	(1.473)	(1.478)	(0.869)	(0.885)	(0.763)	(0.779)	(1.012)	(1.125)
Treatment D	0.210**	0.095	1.570***	1.616**	0.186	0.162	0.651***	0.453***
\times Period _{t+2}	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.502)	(0.626)	(0.121)	(0.118)	(0.132)	(0.105)
Treatment D	0.210**	0.254**	1.689***	1.978***	0.507**	0.610***	0.502***	0.330
$\times \text{Period}_{t+1}$	(0.096)	(0.104)	(0.517)	(0.585)	(0.225)	(0.191)	(0.151)	(0.277)
Treatment D	0.342***	0.293**	1.849***	1.995***	0.609**	0.637**	0.740***	0.553
×	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.519)	(0.616)	(0.292)	(0.253)	(0.175)	(0.292)
Period _{t0}	(0.123)		(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.232)	(0.200)	(0.175)	(0.232)
Treatment D	0.373***	0.060	1.799***	1.541**	0.774*	0.591	0.836***	0.604
×	(0.128)	(0.161)	(0.536)	(0.803)	(0.475)	(0.458)	(0.289)	(0.470)
Period _{t-1}	(0.120)	(0.101)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.473)	(0.400)	(0.203)	(0.470)
Treatment D	0.471**	0.183	1.739***	1.520*	0.949**	0.786*	0.803***	0.576
×	(0.203)	(0.210)	(0.589)	(0.831)	(0.430)	(0.412)	(0.267)	(0.442)
Period _{t-2}	(0.200)	(0.210)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.400)	(0.412)	(0.207)	(0.442)
Treatment D	0.376***	0.136	1.968***	1.821**	1.162***	1.037***	1.023***	0.804*
×	(0.123)	(0.144)	(0.479)	(0.692)	(0.290)	(0.282)	(0.275)	(0.424)
Period _{t-3}	(0.123)	(0.144)	(0.473)	(0.032)	(0.230)	(0.202)	(0.275)	(0.424)
Treatment D								
×	1.247***	0.939***	2.610***	2.360***	1.548***	1.369***	1.321***	1.090*
Period _{t-4,}	(0.344)	(0.348)	(0.280)	(0.556)	(0.231)	(0.272)	(0.456)	(0.603)
forward					1			
Construction		0.709**		1.085		0.567		0.118
Construction		(0.278)		(0.920)		(0.399)		(0.580)
Constant	16.18***	10.34***	15.25***	6.290	14.84***	10.19***	14.26***	13.39***
	(0.504)	(2.45)	(0.516)	(8.038)	(0.272)	(3.13)	(0.265)	(4.85)
N	98	90	98	90	98	90	97	90
$\frac{R^2}{Clustered stands}$	0.24	0.25	0.36	0.37	0.42	0.42	0.20	0.21 Significant a

Difference-in-Difference Regression: Control Group 1

Clustered standard errors, corrected for small number of clusters; * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%.

Treatment and Control group -Spillover effect


Treatment group:

Lipa City, Ibaan and Batangas City

Control group:

(municipalities belonging to neighboring Quezon province)

Candelaria Dolores San Antonio Tiaong



	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Property	Property	Business	Business	Regulatory	Regulatory	User	User
	tax	tax	tax	tax	fees	fees	charge	charge
Treatment D	1.55535	0.736	1.067	0.438	1.372	0.924	0.990	0.364
	(1.263)	(0.874)	(1.316)	(1.407)	(1.123)	(1.046)	(1.095)	(1.028)
Treatment D	0.421**	-0.083	1.189***	0.991**	0.248***	-0.019	0.408***	-0.010
\times Period _{t+2}	(0.150)	(0.301)	(0.391)	(0.450)	(0.084)	(0.248)	(0.132)	(0.250)
Treatment D	0.447**	0.574***	1.264***	1.502***	0.449**	0.515***	0.317**	0.434**
$\times \text{Period}_{t+1}$	(0.160)	(0.118)	(0.415)	(0.542)	(0.142)	(0.169)	(0.164)	(0.167)
Treatment D	0.497***	0.570**	1.440***	1.641***	0.604**	0.642***	0.350	0.422
×	(0.128)	(0.223)	(0.417)	(0.482)	(0.183)	(0.181)	(0.271)	(0.158)
Period _{t0}	(0.120)		(0.417)	(0.402)	(0.103)	(0.101)	(0.271)	(0.150)
Treatment D	1.294**	0.387	2.256**	1.779**	1.318**	0.838*	0.959	0.197
×	-			-			(0.714)	(0.560)
Period _{t-1}	(0.674)	(0.728)	(0.957)	(0.470)	(0.649)	(0.448)	(0.714)	(0.500)
Treatment D	1.163*	0.336	2.226**	1.804**	1.482**	1.044**	0.941	0.247
×	(0.645)	(0.594)	(0.971)	(0.531)	(0.634)	-	(0.704)	(0.531)
Period _{t-2}	(0.045)	(0.594)	(0.971)	(0.551)	(0.034)	(0.413)	(0.704)	(0.551)
Treatment D	1.702*	0.450	2.785**	2.070***	1.901***	1.238***	1.732***	0.676
×		0.450 (0.578)	(1.081)	•			(0.598)	(0.515)
Period _{t-3}	(0.980)	(0.576)	(1.001)	(0.544)	(0.630)	(0.369)	(0.596)	(0.515)
Treatment D								
×	2.573***	1.100	3.428***	2.560***	2.288***	1.509***	2.030***	0.787
Period _{t-4.}	(0.900)	(0.758)	(0.928)	(0.350)	(0.563)	(0.452)	(0.607)	(0.745)
forward								
		2.283**		1.577		1.207		1.942*
Construction		(1.172)		(1.196)		(0.855)		(1.028)
Constant	14.69***	-2.499	14.18***	2.230	13.66***	4.597	13.08***	-1.612
Constant	(0.408)	(8.839)	(0.991)	(9.094)	(0.879)	(6.566)	(0.649)	(7.84)
Ν	`80 ´	73	7 9	7 3	80	73	`77 <i>´</i>	73
R^2	0.29	0.41	0.37	0.44	0.43	0.50	0.26	0.39

Difference-in-Difference Regression: Spillover

Clustered standard errors, corrected for small number of clusters; * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%.





Table 1: Numerical estimation of Regions	f difference in difference co Outco Me	efficient using regional data o Pre- railway	f Uzbekistan for periods 200 Post- railway period	Differe Differe nce
Non- affected group	GDP growth rate	8.3	8.5	0.2
Affected Group	GDP growth rate	7.2	9.4	2.2
				2.0



GDP

GDP	Term	Connectivity effect	Regional effect	Spillover effect
Launching	Short	2.83***[4.48]	0.70[0.45]	1.33[1.14]
Effects	Mid	2.5***[6.88]	0.36[0.29]	1.27[1.46]
	Long	2.06***[3.04]	-0.42[-0.29]	2.29**[2.94]
Anticipated	Short	0.19[0.33]	0.85[1.75]	-0.18[-0.20]
year	Mid	0.31[0.51]	0.64[1.30]	-0.02[-0.03]
- ~	Long	0.07[0.13]	-0.006[-0.01]	0.50[0.67]
Postponed E	ffects	1.76*[1.95]	-1.49[-0.72]	2.58*[2.03]
Anticipated	Short	-1.54[-1.66]	1.42[0.78]	-1.32[-0.92]
years	Mid	0.32[0.44]	0.84[1.42]	0.13[0.13]
2 Xe	Long	0.11[0.15]	0.10[0.16]	0.87[1.19]
Postponed E	ffects	-0.14[-0.20]	-1.71[-1.35]	1.05[1.44]

Note: t-values are in parenthesis. t-value measures how many standard errors the coefficient is away from zero.

legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

To Create Incentive Mechanism

To Avoid Moral Hazard Problem

	Normal Case	Revenue Bond
Normal Case	(50A, r) Management Investors company	(50A, 100B)
Revenue Bond	(100A, r)	(100A, 100B) Management Investors Company

- Maavulsi Vachina - Kaia Haivartite

Public Private Partnership (PPP)

- (1) Risk sharing between private and public sector
- (2) Incentive cut costs and to increase revenue
 → Avoid political intervention
 - Bonus payment for employees who run infrastructure
- (3) Many projects could be started by PPP → Utilize domestic savings
 - → life insurance and Pension funds (long term)
- (4) Indirect Effects are important (tourism, manufacturing, agriculture, services)