







Renewable Energy Auctions in Kazakhstan

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





- ☐ Kazakhstan has great potential for RES, especially for solar, wind and hydro
- One of the most advanced countries in Central Asia in terms of energy market and tariff policy
- Introduced the "RES Law" in 2009
- Concept for transition to Green Economy (2013) setting targets
 - ☐ 3% wind + solar by 2020
 - ☐ 30% RES (+ nuclear) by 2030
 - □ 50% RES (+ nuclear) by 2050

Focus is on wind (4.6GW by 2030) but installation trend shows solar will play a big role

□ North-south power unbalance (North-South HV corridor being reinforced) calling for additional generation capacity in the southern regions







Jul 2009 - Law on the support to renewable energy sources ("RES Law") May 2013 - Concept on the transition to Green Economy Jun 2014 - Introduction of the Feed-in Tariffs and related rules Mar 2015 - First standardised RE PPA model with FSC Jul 2016 - Rules for the formation of the RE Siting Plan Nov 2016 - New rules for inclusion into the RE project list ("RE List") Dec 2016 – As of end of year, wind and solar share in generation is 0.4%







Obstacles for the development of RES in Kazakhstan

Key obstacles for the development of renewable energy in Kazakhstan

- 1. Need for a more transparent and reliable regulatory framework
- Lack of long-term creditworthiness and short-term liquidity of the off-taker (FSC)
- 3. Uncertainties related to the possibility to interconnect a significant amount of non-programmable RES projects to the grid
- 4. Unattractiveness of the FIT due to lack of foreign currency indexation*
- 5. Weak Renewable Energy re-purchase obligation on Conditional Consumers
- 6. Lack of bankability of the current contractual framework
- 7. Shortage of long-term Tenge financing

^{*}MoE introduced a partial indexation in April 2017
















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Assignment criteria	Pricing criteria
First-in first-served	FIT (classic)
First to apply is granted access to the mechanism and others to follow up to a certain cumulated capacity or incentive cap	The tariff is fixed and determined at central level based on current market trends and costs
Competitive scheme	Competition-based pricing
A fixed price is assigned to successful bidders after developers are put in direct competition and are evaluated based on a range of criteria	The price is fixed and determined based on competition between bidders. Pricing criteria can be, e.g., lowest price offered.
Direct proposal	Negotiation
Project developers proposing projects and negotiating conditions with the off-taker / system operator	The tariff is negotiated with the counterparty





Source: IRENA (2015)







Feed-in

- Increasing use of competitive schemes in consolidated and new markets
- Competition drives costs down
- Leading to «true price» or best price for a given market
- Competition stimulates technological improvements

- Scheme being phased out in developed markets
- Markets (prices) changing quickly → FITs become outdated as their are issued
- FITs may not reflect a perception of country risk
- Require frequent policy re-adjustments
- Ok for small projects (domestic, etc.)



Auction or Tender?

Auction

(e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Italy, Chile, Perù, South Africa)

- Bid for volume (capacity or energy)
- Typically BOO schemes
- Own projects

Tender

(e.g. Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Oman, Jordan, Saudi Arabia)

- Bid for specific projects
- Various schemes
 (EPC / BOT / BOO), possibly through PPP
- Central planning and own projects















Evolution of average **solar** prices in auctions / tenders

Evolution of average auction prices for **onshore wind** energy





Source: IRENA, Renewable Energy Auctions – Analysing 2016, IRENA, 2017



Preparation

- Define goals
- Assess existing market situation
- Establish desired level of committment
- Identify key parties
- Define Auction budget
- •Define preliminary implementation schedule
- Assess regulatory existing framework
- Assess best practive and beenhmarks
- Planning of projects (centralised vs decentralised)
- Identify constraints
- Identify other desired objectives / expectations (e.g. Socio-economic development, etc.)

Design

- Establish competition strategy
- Define Auction volume(s)
- •Identify demand-side responsibilities
- Define qualification criteria
- Prepare documentation package
- •Define bidding procedure and selection criteria
- •Define selection criteria
- •Set up competition enhancement instruments
- Establish rules for determining payment to winners
- •Fix implementation schedule

Implementation

- Announce Auction
- •Organise meeting with interested bidders
- •Launch call for bids
- Respond to questions / requests for clarification raised by bidders during the process
- Shortlist bidders
- •Collect bids within deadline
- Evaluate bids
- Select winners
- •Publish results
- Negotiate and sign contracts selected bidders

Monitoring

- Monitor status of implementation of RES projects
- Monitor execution of signed contracts
- Monitor Auction KPIs





Source: IRENA, Renewable Energy Auctions - A guide to design, IRENA, 2015











Define contractual framework

- BOO-like schemes with a certain level of support from the Government
- General contractual frameworks regulating relationship between the operator and the Government (or Governmental Agency) (PPA, GCA, land lagreements, etc.)


Define Auctioneer

- Regulatory agency / electricity market operator / MOE or MOE-related agencies
- Role of the Auctioneer: (i) set-up infrastructure for conducting Auctions, (ii) define Auction structure and prepare documentation, (iii) monitor Auctions


Off-taking scheme

- Creditworthiness & short-term liquidity
- Necessary skills and knowledge to manage the new contractual basis
- Strong re-purchase obligations











GENERAL

- Auctioneer → KOREM (+MoE)
- □ Off-taker → FSC
- \square Design of auction \rightarrow MoE to issue (and revise) procedures through legal acts
- Supporting scheme → No major changes (evaluate possible extension of the term to 20-25 years)
- □ Contractual scheme →
 - Dedicated PPA with fixed price (vs FSC)
 - Dedicated Grid Connection Agreement (vs KEGOC/RES)
 - Re-purchase obligation (FSC vs Conditional Consumers)
- Auction structure →
 - Qualification stage
 - Bidding stage (electronic)
 - Contract negotiation and signing
- lacktriangle Auction format igred electronic, via KOREM online trading platform
- Auction costs → compensated by Bidders (participation fee 5-15kUSD/project))
- \Box Frequency \rightarrow 6 monthly for at least 1.5-2 years



QUALIFICATION

- Technology → Solar PV and Wind (and Mini-Hydro?)
- Restrictions → None, any project that qualifies can compete (in the same technology group)
- Volume → Overall volume (MW) and specific for zones (depending on Siting Plan). Volume should be disclosed at the auction announcement
- Local content requirements (LCR) / dedicated support → Not foreseen
- Socio-economic development requirements → Not foreseen
- Other qualification requirements → max project size, use of state-of-art technology, need for land rights / concession, permits and licenses, access to the grid, etc.
- □ Projects → self-developed by Bidders
- Existing projects →
 - Projects already in the RE List (PPA not signed) may elect to participate to auction
 - Projects with signed PPA (construction not yet started) may elect to participate to auction and, if selected they can choose between (i) existing PPA or (ii) new PPA



BIDDING

- \square Bidding procedure \rightarrow Electronic bidding and submission of documents (KOREM)
- □ Ceiling price →
 - \square MoE to define ceiling price. For 1st auction, ceiling price = current FiT (?)
 - Ceiling price should be disclosed beforehand (at least for the 1st auction)
- Selection criteria →
 - Lower price (or lower FSC exposure, i.e. Price + FOREX component)
 - In case of same price, other criteria to be defined (LCR, earliest COD, other) based on MoE priorities
- \square Matching demand-offer \rightarrow Upward adjustment (to be evaluated by MoE + KEGOC)
- □ Payment →
 - Pay-as-bid
 - Energy-oriented with fixed energy price (per kWh)
 - ☐ FOREX indexation (ca 80-85% or subject to bid)
 - CPI adjustment




SELLER'S OBLIGATIONS

- Securing Bidder's commitment → Bid bond/deposit
 - Returned upon (i) not qualifying, (ii) losing auction or (iii) signing PPA
 - Lost if (i) Bidder does not bid after qualification or (ii) PPA not signed in time
 - Bond/deposit to increase after qualification (e.g. 1% CAPEX before, 2% after)
- PPA signing → Deadline (e.g. 1 month)
- Schedule →
 - Longstop Financial Closure (FC) Date: 3-6 months from signing
 - Required COD (RCOD): 18-24 months from FC
 - Longstop COD (LSCOD): RCOD + 6 months
 - ☐ Term: 15 years (but what come after PPA expiry? MoE to evaluate possible extension)
- Securing schedule →
 - Performance Guarantee (bond/deposit) for securing COD to be provided at signing
 - Delay in signing → loss of tariff and deposit
 - □ Delay in FC → PPA termination and loss of (part of or all) Performance Guarantee
 - \square Delay in COD \rightarrow delay LDs (or reduced energy price by x%/month) until LSCOD (\rightarrow termination)



Auction schedule – an example





Implementation of the Auction Mechanism in Kazakhstan according to international best practice requires that majority of the RE primary and secondary laws, including legislation developed recently in 2015-2016, is considerably modified

Main legislation ("RES Law" #165 - 4.7.2009)

- New terminology to be introduced
- Additional authorities to MoE for preparing & approving Auction Rules and define Ceiling Price
- Redefine roles of MoE, FSC and KORFM
- Introduce general terms and conditions of the competitive schemes
- (Potentially) Extension of the term from 15 to 20-25 years

Secondary legislation (MoE Orders)

- Redefine role of the "RE List" and introduce "qualification criteria"
- Review queuing procedure of "Siting Plan"
- Modified (new) PPA and GCA to cover intl. bankability requirements
- Introduce concept of ceiling tariff
- Introduce Auction Rules
- Amend formula for calculation of the RE support tariff

Land Code

 Public land for RE projects shall be allocated by means of tenders → this should be reconsidered
















An aggregate of medium-term and long-term relationships between the government and the private sector for the provision of socially significant works or/and services of development, financing, construction, reconstruction, rehabilitation, and exploitation or servicing of objects by the private sector











- Contractual shortcomings under the RES legislation (e.g. PPA)
- Current tariff insufficient to guarantee sustainability of projects
- Selection of a private partner may take place via tendering or via "direct negotiation" (private initiative). The latter is a much simpler procedure
- Potential need for development of energy projects in certain areas of the country that are "not attractive" and/or "not competitive"

- project needs to be "pre-planned" with known location, technical requirements, etc.
- developer shall justify the "social importance" of the project
- Complicated and time consuming procedures
- In case of co-financing or CAPEX compensation, ownership needs to be transferred to the Govt. → BOO scheme not possible + Govt. has no capacity to manage
- Compatibility with Siting Plan and FiT is not clear



CONCLUSIONS

- PPP mechanism cannot be seen as a replacement for other mechanisms (FiT or competitive schemes) but as an "alternative" for specific cases
- ☐ State support measures under PPPs may be used by the Govt. for specific projects of greater need (remote areas, off-grid systems, strategic projects)
- Certain aspects need to be regulated properly and adjusted to the RE context









Key messages

Auctions are potentially a good instruments for defining the "actual value" of renewables in Kazakhstan	
☐ Regardless of the support scheme, some key barriers have to be removed:	
Greater transparency and clarity of the regulatory scheme	
☐ Introduce a satisfactory FOREX indexation of the tariff	
Strengthen the energy off-taking scheme	
Introduce a bankable contractual framework	
☐ Implementing the auction mechanism requires time and effort, first projects will not start operation soon → 2020 targets are unlikely to be met	
lacktriangle Amendments to the main and secondary legislation are required	
☐ PPP mechanism cannot be seen as a replacement for other mechanisms but as an "alternative" for specific projects of strategic importance	



Next steps

- ☐ MoE to proceed with the design of the auction. Ideally an "auction team" should be set up, composed of MoE personnel, international consultants, local legal advisors, to work in close cooperation with FSC and KOREM. Ideally, a Project Manager should be appointed to ensure adherence to schedule
- ☐ Remove existing barriers to the development of RES in Kazakhstan
- ☐ Design the auction
 - Defining each element starting from the preparatory work done
 - ☐ Prepare the necessary documents and forms
 - ☐ Prepare the contract forms
- ☐ Capacity building inside MoE and FSC for managing implementation and monitoring phase
- ☐ Draft and implement the necessary legal changes



