

Promoting Trade and Investment in Central and West Asia: The Case for a Regional Trade Credit and Investment Guarantee Agency

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- **Draft Project Concept**
- **Rationale**
- **Agency's Key Product Offering**
- **Expected Impact, Outcome and Outputs**
- **Potential ADB Role**
- **Key Issues**
- **Next Steps**
- **Appendix A: Indicative Problem Tree – Central and West Asia**
- **Appendix B: Example of Similar Project in Sub-Saharan Africa (ATI)**
- **Appendix C: Option 1 – Replicating ATI: Trade Credit and Investment Guarantee Agency (TCIGA)**
- **Appendix D: Option 2 – Trade Credit and Investment Re-Guarantee Agency (TCIReGA)**

- **Regional trade credit and investment guarantee or re-guarantee agency**
- **Foster inter- and intra-regional trade and foreign direct investment (FDI)**
- **Access to pre-export and trade finance & FDI protection**
- **Beside Central and West Asia Other participants may include:**
 - **other trading and investor partner countries**
 - **non-state entities:**
 - **multilateral, regional and national development banks**
 - **export credit agencies (ECAs) and export-import banks (EXIM Banks)**
 - **private risk insurers and reinsurers (PRIs)**
- **Participation of PRIs facilitates public-private partnerships (PPPs)**
- **Possible PPP solution: multilateral re-guarantee agency with PRI as primary underwriter**

- **Regional challenges:**
 - diversify economies
 - increased employment
 - development of non-traditional sectors
- **Low intra-regional trade (excl. PRC): 6.5% of trade (2001-2016)**
- **Least access to trade and pre-export finance and FDI protection**
- **Inability to compete internationally**
- **Less potential for:**
 - vertical (cross-border) business integration
 - horizontal (cross-border) product differentiation
 - development of non-traditional export sectors
 - development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
- **Denial of vital role ECAs & EXIM Banks in OECD & other regions Asia**

- **Mid-term Review CAREC 2020**
 - adverse impacts since 2008 on GDP growth and trade across the region
- **CAREC 2020**
 - regional cooperation has become an imperative
 - necessity to focus on two strategic objectives:
 - expanding trade
 - improving competitiveness
 - infrastructure improvements must be supported by trade facilitation measures to directly impact intra- and inter-regional trade
- **CAREC's 2006 Comprehensive Action Plan**
 - developing innovative approaches to cooperative arrangements (incl. PPPs)

- **Effective political risk mitigation associated with trade and FDI**
- **Enhanced governance structure & institutional capacity building**
- **International credit rating to help reduce financing cost due to:**
 - lower sovereign ratings
 - non-rated sovereigns
- **Operational synergies & cost efficiencies:**
 - Economies-of-scale
 - Reduced overheads
 - Risk diversification and sharing
 - Permanent center of knowledge and expertise
 - Greater access to co- and re-insurance capacity
 - ‘Leapfrog’: cross-border mergers national ECAs in OECD since 1990s

- Short-term whole turnover credit insurance (< 2 years) allowing regional exporters and domestic suppliers to:
 - compete internationally by trading on an open-account basis
 - benefit from cost-effective protection against non-payment
 - target foreign and local buyers under pre-approved credit limits
- Medium-to-long-term supplier and buyer credits (> 2 years and < 15 years) allowing regional suppliers, contractors and service providers to:
 - submit bids for contracts for infrastructure projects
 - Compete directly with non-regional suppliers, contractors and providers who have access to ECA or EXIM Bank support
- Long-term political risk insurance (< 15 years) fostering intra- and inter-regional FDI

- **Impact:**
 - Sustainable economic growth
 - Increased employment opportunities
 - Better Diversified Central and West Asia economies
- **Outcome:**
 - Improved international regional competitiveness
- **Outputs:**
 - Established multilateral ECA based on best market practice
 - Secured PRI participation and PPP solution

- **In role of CAREC Secretariat, ADB is well poised to help:**
 - develop the project concept
 - structure, establish, and operationalize the Agency
 - engage PRI participation under a preferred PPP modality
- **Subject to interest from eligible DMCs, ADB may:**
 - provide financing support (subject to ADB approvals) for respective equity participations in the Agency
 - help mobilize financing support from other MDBs for similar participations from countries outside the ADB membership

- **Arguments in favor of multilateral ECA solution instead of:**
 - **national ECAs:**
 - Economies of scale
 - Credit rating of national ECA capped by sovereign rating
 - Enhance credit rating national ECAs through ‘fronting’ or ‘cut-through’
 - **guarantee trust fund:**
 - establishment of permanent regional institutional capacity
 - greater visibility as permanent institution to attract risk-sharing arrangements
- **Re-guarantee Agency (e.g. AfricaRe) vs. Guarantee Agency (e.g. ATI)**
 - make use of primary PRI underwriter IT systems, databases and networks
 - far more time-efficient and cost-effective implementation
 - Agency can become fully operational relatively fast

- **Ensure complementarity with other regional MDB initiatives**
- **Eligibility and timing of admission of non-regional countries from Eurasian region, Middle East, South Asia, etc.**
- **Preliminary consultation of ADB DMCs' –in principle-interest**
- **Determination of minimum 'stop-go' number of interested ADB DMCs**

- **TPCC delegates to sound – in principle – interest**
- **Subject to minimum ‘stop-go’ number, ADB will:**
 - **conduct bilateral consultations**
 - **seek internal approval to conduct pre-feasibility study**
- **Subject to pre-feasibility, ADB will:**
 - **develop and finalize project concept**
 - **seek validation of project concept participating DMCs**
 - **seek internal project concept approval for transaction technical assistance and proposed financing support**



Appendix B: Example of Similar Project in Sub-Saharan Africa (African Trade Insurance Agency)

- World Bank (IDA) initiative in late 90s and became operational in 2001
- Built on platform of Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
- ATI is structured as a PPP:
 - Unique multilateral body which Treaty is open to membership by:
 - all 54 African Union (AU) countries
 - non-African countries
 - non-state members
 - ATI membership history shows that it is likely to further expand over time:
 - 2001: 7 countries (Burundi, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia)
 - 2017: 5 additional members (Benin, DRC, Ethiopia, Madagascar and Zimbabwe) and 4 countries in process of completing membership (Djibouti, Eritrea, Liberia and Sudan)
 - ATI has no procurement restrictions to date
 - ATI also allows for non-state members:
 - AfDB, Africa Re, Atradius Group (Netherlands), COMESA, PTA Bank, SACE (Italy), UK Export Finance (United Kingdom) and ZEP Re
 - Atradius Group has been a corporate member of ATI since 2001 and has provided treaty reinsurance on ATI's whole-turnover credit insurance portfolio

Appendix B: Example of Similar Project in Sub-Saharan Africa (African Trade Insurance Agency)


- **Country capital contributions to secure balanced voting rights:**
 - ATI's authorized capital (paid-in capital by AU countries): \$1 billion (at least 51%)
 - Larger economies (e.g. DRC, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan): maximum \$25 million
 - Smaller economies: minimum \$ 7.5 million
 - Average expected contribution per country: \$10 million
- **Leveraging ATI's underwriting capacity**
 - Initial 2001 structure was sub-optimal (no leverage; silos; cash-collateral, etc.):
 - paid-in equity: \$1.3 MM
 - paid-in underwriting capital: \$134 MM (held in trust accounts in London)
 - underwriting capacity: \$134 MM (no gearing due to country silo constraints)
 - The 2007 restructuring converted underwriting capital into equity:

	<u>2007</u>	<u>2017</u>
• paid-in equity (held in trust accounts in London):	\$134 MM	\$200 MM
• net underwriting capacity (typical internal gearing of 1:3):	\$400 MM	\$600 MM
• gross capacity underwriting capacity (typical 60% reinsurance):	\$1,000 MM	\$1,500 MM

- Obtained S&P 'A' credit rating in March 2008
- Facilitated \$17 billion in trade credit and FDI to date
- Effective preferred creditor status and political risk mitigation through a '*de jure*' (not '*de facto*') cross default with IDA
 - If an ATI member country were to incur a loss to ATI (i.e. political and sovereign risks), there is a legal obligation for that country to make ATI whole within 60 days after it has paid a valid claim
 - If not made whole, ATI will inform IDA (World Bank)
 - IDA will then allow the country to cure this situation within another 10 days
 - If not cured, IDA will have the right (not the obligation) to invoke:
 - a cross-default of its entire sovereign portfolio; and
 - suspend operations
 - Creates more favorable environment for traders, investors, financiers and underwriters to assume commercial risks associated with trade and FDI in Africa

Appendix C: Option 1 – Project Structure

Replicating ATI: Trade Credit and Investment Guarantee Agency (TCIGA)




¹ A member state's equity investment ranges between \$[10] MM and \$50 MM and will be determined in proportion to its GDP and is to be paid-in in full


² Member countries may fund their equity contributions from their own resources (e.g. Sovereign Wealth Funds of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and/or Turkmenistan)

³ MDBs, such as ADB (and/or ADF), World Bank (and/or IDA) and/or IsDB may consider funding a member state's equity investment (as needed)

⁴ ADB (PSOD), IFC and/or EBRD may consider participating through non-sovereign equity investments and /or an operational loan to fund the Agency's start-up operations


⁵ Non-state members comprise bilateral, regional and national development banks, ECAs and EXIM Banks, private investors (including private risk insurance and reinsurance companies)






Appendix C: Option 1 – Underwriting Capacity

Replicating ATI: Trade Credit and Investment Guarantee Agency (TCIGA)



Appendix D: Option 2 – Project Structure

Trade Credit and Investment Re-Guarantee Agency (TCIReGA)



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
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
⁶ Private investors (including private risk insurance and reinsurance companies)

⁷ Multilateral TCIReGA enters into quota-share treaty and facultative re-insurance / re-guarantee arrangements with private primary underwriter (e.g. taking 100% PRI and up to 80% CRI)



Appendix D: Option 2 – Legal Structure

Trade Credit and Investment Re-Guarantee Agency (TCIReGA)



Appendix D: Option 2 – Underwriting capacity

Trade Credit and Investment Re-Guarantee Agency (TCIReGA)

TCIReGA
Retrocession:
Leverage up to
3-4 times

Multilateral TCIReGA becomes a distributor of inter- and intra-regional trade credit and investment risks with access to the quota share treaty and facultative retrocession markets, potentially, increasing its gross underwriting capacity up to \$2,250 MM – 5,000 MM

TCIReGA
Country Risk
Limit = 3-5
times that
country's paid-
in capital

Risk portfolio diversification will allow multilateral TCIReGA to gear its own paid-in capital 3-5 times up to \$750 MM - 1,250 MM in net underwriting capacity

Total Paid-in Capital (initially \$[250] MM) plus Reserves Multilateral TCIReGA

A private insurer / guarantor would typically retain 20% and cede to its reinsurers 80% of it underwritten risk exposure. With a gross TCIReGA underwriting capacity of \$5 billion, the private insurer could underwrite at least \$6.25 billion in gross risk exposure.

